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Abstract
Authentication schemes are practiced globally to verify the legitimacy of users
and servers for the exchange of data in different facilities. Generally, the server
verifies a user to provide resources for different purposes. But due to the large net-
work system, the authentication process has become complex and therefore, time-
to-time different authentication protocols have been proposed for the multi-server
architecture. However, most of the protocols are vulnerable to various security at-
tacks and their performance is not efficient. In this paper, we propose a secure and
energy-efficient remote user authentication protocol for multi-server systems. The
results show that the proposed protocol is comparatively∼44 % more efficient and
needs ∼38 % less communication cost. We also demonstrate that with only two-
factor authentication, the proposed protocol is more secure from the earlier related
authentication schemes.
Authentication, Energy, Multi-server, Security.
1 Introduction
In today’s emerging world, the Internet has become more and more popular for its
various facilities, and it is extensively used in government organizations, smart city
applications, education sectors, business, private sectors, etc. Further, there are many
applications in which users should get diverse services from different systems remotely,
e.g., banking system, healthcare, smart agriculture, smart grid, home automation, etc.
Consequently, the network has become highly sophisticated and demanding. Hence,
it is not easy to fulfill all users’ requirements at the same time, and it leads to the
provision of multi-server based system through which applicants can get services any
time without any interruption.
In general, server and user should authenticate each other before transmitting/delivering
resources to prevent various attacks in a public environment. Therefore, a secure and
efficient authentication scheme is required to confirm the legitimacy of the server and a
user. In most of the systems, both (user and server) practice the authentication process
before starting a communication [1], [2], [3], [4]. Fig. 1 shows a user-server connection
representation for a multi-server environment in which various users are connected to
different servers to obtain facility. These servers are typically synchronized with each
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other, and a user has a smart card to get authenticated by the server. In this scheme,
a user cannot connect to multiple servers at the same time, but he/she can establish a
connection with different servers alternatively as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: User-server mutual authentication overview in multi-server based structure
1.1 Related Works
Li et al. [5] suggested an authentication system based on an artificial neural networks
to resist a replay attack for the multi-server architecture. Lin et al. [6] recommended a
new authentication protocol to protect a modification attack and a replay attack. Tsaur
et al. [7] noticed that an off-line password guessing is feasible in their previous scheme
and thus, they designed an improved authentication method to prevent an off-line pass-
word guessing attack. However, they ([5], [6], and [7]) used the DiffieHellman key
exchange concept for the encryption and decryption. Therefore, these schemes are
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle, impersonation attacks. Besides, they requires high
computational time to perform all necessary operations.
Juang [8] suggested a mutual authentication and key agreement system for the mul-
tiple server framework with low computation and communication cost. Besides, this
scheme has various merits, i.e., only one-time registration, no need of a verification ta-
ble, freely chosen password by a user, mutual authentication, low communication and
computation cost. However, they used the symmetric key concept to design an authenti-
cation protocol [8] and thus, there is a key challenge to share the encryption/decryption
key between the server and a user. Besides, the encrypted secret key is saved in a smart
card. For all these reasons, the scheme [8] is vulnerable to smart card lost, replay,
impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Liao and Wang [9] proposed an authentication protocol to resist distinct attacks
(replay, insider, server spoofing, and stolen verifier). However, Hsiang and Shi [10]
found a server spoofing attack is feasible in [9] as discussed in [10]. To overcome
server spoofing and session key attacks, they [10] suggested an enhanced remote user
authentication method for the multi-server structure. In 2014, Lee et al. [11] came up
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with an extensive chaotic based authentication mechanism to prevent various attacks
(plain-text, insider, impersonation, and replay). However, it is vulnerable to denial
of service and session key attacks. Besides, both (server and user) need to exchange
messages three times to establish a connection for services. Subsequently, Banerjee
et al. [12] observed that smart card lost and user impersonation attacks are present in
earlier authentication schemes. Then, they proposed a smart card-based anonymous
authentication system to prevent security attacks, e.g., user impersonation, smart card
lost, forward secrecy, and insider. In 2016, Sun et al. [13] noticed some loopholes in
[12], i.e., smart card lost, replay, user impersonation, session key, and password guess-
ing. Accordingly, they advised an authentication mechanism using dynamic identity
to protect against various attacks (user impersonation, replay, insider, smart card lost,
session key, and password guessing). However, we identify that the scheme [13] is
still vulnerable to some attacks, e.g., smart card lost, off-line password guessing, and
replay.
Li et al. [14] found security concerns (no single registration, no password update
support, and spoofing) in [11] and proposed a chaotic based key-agreement scheme
for enhancing security features. However, Irshad et al. [16] found security drawbacks
(password guessing, stolen smart card, and user impersonation) in [14]. In addition,
they proposed an advanced system to resist identified security concerns in [16]. How-
ever, Irshad et al.’s scheme [16] requires high computational time, storage cost, and
communication overhead. Jangirala et al. [15] noticed some security issues in ear-
lier system and advised an extended authentication protocol to enhance security. They
also stated that the scheme [15] is resistant to multiple attacks (password guessing,
stolen smart card, replay, man-in-the-middle, server spoofing, and forgery), but this
scheme is weak in performance. Recently, Ying and Nayak [17] suggested a remote
user authentication mechanism for multi-server architecture using self-certified public
key cryptography to improve performance results, but this protocol is susceptible to dif-
ferent attacks, i.e., smart card lost, impersonation, replay, password guessing, session
key disclosure, and insider. Moreover, comparatively it requires more computational
resources.
1.2 Contributions
From the literature survey ([11] - [17]), we notice that most of authentication methods
are vulnerable to different security attacks and they need more computational resources
for the implementation. Thus, we understand that a secure and efficient remote user
verification protocol is required for the multi server-based system to provide on-time
services and to resist against various security attacks. Therefore, we propose an energy-
efficient and more secure remote user authentication scheme, and our contributions are
as follows in this paper.
• Design an advanced energy-effective mutual authentication protocol.
• Security discussions to check strengths against different attacks, e.g., password
guessing, replay, impersonation, insider, session key disclosure, smart card lost,
and man-in-the-middle.
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• Present performance analysis for the proposed method and do the comparison
with relevant authentication schemes for different performance measures.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we explain the system architecture
and the adversary model is described in section 3. In section 4, we propose an advanced
authentication protocol using a smart card for multi-server based system. Section 5
discusses performance and security analysis of the suggested system. Then, we do
a comparison of the suggested protocol with other related authentication schemes in
terms of security and performance. We summarize our conclusions in section 6.
2 System Architecture
The registration authority (RA), smart cards, smart card readers, and servers are com-
ponents in the multi-server system. Users access resources from the server after prov-
ing their legitimacy and this data access can be carried out using a smart card through
a smart card reader. The RA is a trusted authority in order to register a new user and
to provide a legal smart card to that user. Servers are used to provide resources to the
legal users and it is highly configured in security, processing power, and storage. A
smart card is used to store some important values and these parameters help its owner
to get resources/services from the server. In general, a smart card is used to establish
a secure connection between a user and the server or to update a user password. The
multi-server architecture based system is classified into three phases as (1) registration
(2) login and authentication (3) password update. The registration phase is initiated
by a new user to become a legitimate person of the system via a secure medium. The
login and authentication phase is executed in the interest of a user to access resources
from the server over a public channel. The password update phase is performed to
change/update a user password via an insecure channel. Fig. 2 shows an extensive
system model overview for different phases by involving different actors.
3 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary model according to [2], [3], [4] for mutual authentication
system between a user and the server in a public environment. Accordingly, an attacker
has the following capabilities.
• An adversary can read/delay/re-transmit packets (transferred over a public chan-
nel).
• An attacker has the ability to extract parameters from a smart card. And this is
feasible after stealing a smart card or getting a lost smart card.
• An adversary can modify messages, which are transmitted through an insecure
medium.
• An attacker can send a forged login request in a polynomial time.
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Figure 2: The system architecture
4 The Proposed Scheme
We suggest an energy-efficient remote user authentication protocol for multi-server
based system to resist various security attacks. The proposed scheme consists of four
phases, (1) server registration, (2) user registration, (3) login and authentication, and
(4) user password update as follows.
4.1 Server Registration
In the multi-server architecture, different servers should be registered with the registra-
tion authority (RA) via an online secure channel. The server registration process is as
follows.
1. A server (Sj) chooses an identity (IDSj ) and password (PWDSj ), and ran-
dom nonce (xj). Then, Sj computes αj = h(IDSj ||PWDSj ||xj) and sends
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Table 1: List of different symbols
Notations Explanations
Ui A user i
IDi Ui’s identity
PWi Ui’s password
Sj A server j
SCi Ui’s smart card
SCRk A smart card reader k
Ni/Nj/b/pi Random nonce
x/y A server’s secret key
yi Ui’s secret key generated by RA
SKUi A session key at Ui end
SKSj A session key at Sj side
ListIDi The list of user identities
ListFi The list of computed values Fi
A An adversary/attacker
⊕ Bit-wise XOR operation
‖ Concatenation operation
h(·) One-way hash function
∆Ta A threshold delay fixed at time a
Tb Generated time-stamp at time b
{IDSj , αj} to the RA.
2. The RA confirms the availability of IDSj and if it is, then the RA does βj =
αj ⊕ IDSj ., and saves βj , αj , ListIDi , ListFi in the Sj’s secure storage.
4.2 User Registration
A new user (Ui) of the system should enroll with the registration authority (RA) once to
become a legal user over a secure channel. Ui gets a smart card (SCi) after completing
the registration process successfully and this SCi helps to get logged into the system
for services. This phase is also shown in Fig. 3.
1. Ui selects IDi, PWi, pi and calculatesAi = pi⊕h(IDi||PWi),Bi = h(PWi||pi).
Then, Ui sends {IDi, Ai, Bi} to the RA over a secure channel.
2. The RA generates a random nonce (say qi for Ui) and enumerates Ci = Ai ⊕
h(qi||x), Di = Ci ⊕ Bi ⊕ IDi, Ei = Ai ⊕ Bi ⊕ h(qi||x), Fi = IDi ⊕ Ai ⊕
Ci. After that, it saves Ai, Di, Ei, ListIDSj into SCi and Fi into the database
securely. Next, the RA sends SCi to Ui via a secure medium.
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Ui RA
Chooses IDi, PWi, pi
Computes...
Ai = h(IDi||PWi)⊕ pi
Bi = h(PWi||pi)
{IDi, Ai, Bi}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Secure channel
Generates qi & Enumerates...
Ci = Ai ⊕ h(qi||x)
Di = Ci ⊕Bi ⊕ IDi
Ei = Ai ⊕Bi ⊕ h(qi||x)
Fi = IDi ⊕Ai ⊕ Ci
SCi =
{
Ai, Di, Ei, h(·), ListIDSj
}
{SCi}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Secure medium
Figure 3: The proposed registration phase
4.3 Login and Authentication
WhenUi wants to access service(s) from the server (Sj), this phase is executed between
a smart card reader (SCRk) and Sj . For this, Ui/SCRk performs following steps. Fig.
4 presents the proposed login and authentication phase.
1. Ui puts SCi, IDi, andPWi into SCRk. Then, SCRk computes p′i = h(IDi||PWi)⊕
Ai, B′i = h(PWi||p′i), C ′i = B′i ⊕ Di ⊕ IDi, h(qi||x) = C ′i ⊕ Ai, E′i =
Ai⊕B′i⊕h(qi||x). Now, SCRk checks the correctness by comparingEi andE′i.
If both are equal, SCRk generates Ni and enumerates AIDi = IDi ⊕ IDSj ,
Gi = Ni ⊕ C ′i ⊕ Ai, Hi = Gi ⊕ h(SIDj ||Ni||T1), Ii = Ni ⊕ p′i ⊕ IDi,
Ji = h(Gi||Hi||Ii||p′i||T1). Then, it sends {IDi, Gi, Ii, Ji, T1} to Sj publicly.
2. Sj confirms the validity of {IDi, Fi, Hi, Ii, T1} by calculating ∆T1 ≤ T2 − T1.
If it is valid, then it computes IDi = βj ⊕ AIDi ⊕ αj , N ′i = Fi ⊕ Gi ⊕ IDi,
H ′i = Gi⊕ h(SIDj ||N ′i ||T1), p′i = N ′i ⊕ IDi⊕ Ii, J ′i = h(Gi||H ′i||Ii||p′i||T1).
Further, Sj performs J ′i
?
= Ji for the verification. Sj continues to the next step
in case of equality. Otherwise, it ends the session immediately.
3. Sj generatesNj and enumeratesKj = N ′i⊕Nj⊕p′i,Mj = h(Kj ||N ′i ||Nj ||J ′i ||T2).
Subsequently, it transfers {Kj ,Mj , T2} to Ui.
4. SCRk calculates ∆T2 ≤ T3 − T2 to check its freshness. And it computes
N ′j = Ni ⊕ Kj ⊕ p′i, M ′j = h(Kj ||Ni||N ′j ||Ji||T2) and verifies M ′j by com-
paring with Mj . If it holds, then SCRk and Sj generates a session key as
h(IDi||SIDj ||Ni||Nj ||p′i||Hi||∆T1). Ultimately, SCRk and Sj communicate
based on this session key for a limited period.
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4.4 Password update
The password change is a facility for the system users to update their PWi for different
reason(s) later. For this, Ui should imitate following steps.
1. Ui inserts SCi, IDi, and PWi into SCRk. Then, SCRk enumerates p′i =
h(IDi||PWi)⊕Ai,B′i = h(PWi||p′i),C ′i = B′i⊕Di⊕IDi, h(qi||x) = C ′i⊕Ai,
E′i = Ai ⊕ B′i ⊕ h(qi||x). Now, SCRk performs Ei ?= E′i to confirm equality.
If it holds, SCRk asks for a new password (PWNewi ) and computes ANewi =
h(IDi||PWNewi)⊕p′i,BNewi = h(PWNewi ||p′i), CNewi = ANewi⊕h(qi||x),
DNewi = BNewi ⊕ IDi ⊕ CNewi , ENewi = ANewi ⊕ h(qi||x) ⊕ BNewi .
After that, SCRk replaces Ai, Di, and Ei by ANewi , DNewi , ENewi into SCi.
Finally, Ui will have updated SCi.
5 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
After proposing an advanced authentication system, we do analysis on this protocol to
verify security robustness and performance efficiency. For this confirmation, we have
discussed security analysis and performance analysis as below.
5.1 Security Analysis
We explain various security attacks and how the proposed system is resistant to differ-
ent attacks. Then, we compare security robustness of the suggested scheme with other
related authentication mechanisms ([11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]).
5.1.1 Password Guessing
If an adversary (A) can identify the correctness of a guessed password (PW ′i ), then a
password guessing attack is possible. SCRk sends {IDi, Gi, Ii, Ji, T1} to Sj over an
open channel. Therefore, A has access to these parameters. To become a successful
in this attack, A needs to compare PW ′i at least with one variable in which PWi
has been used and that parameter should be available publicly. Gi is computed using
PWi indirectly and thus, A has an opportunity to know correctness of PW ′i if he or
she can get/derive/compute G′i. For this, A requires Ni, Ci, Ai. However, Ni and
p′i are generated randomly at Ui end, and these random values are only known to Ui.
Therefore, it is difficult to obtain Ai and Ni exactly. Further,A does not have essential
credentials (Bi and Di) to compute Ci. Hence, it is infeasible to derive G′i by having
only PW ′i . Consequently, A has no opportunity to compare G′i. For this reason, A
cannot apply a password guessing attack in the suggested system.
5.1.2 User Impersonation
A user impersonation attack is feasible if A has a favorable plan to create a fake login
request, and it should be accepted by Sj . For this,A should know or compute IDi, Gi,
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Ui/SCRk Sj
Inserts IDi & PWi
Enumerates...
p′i = h(IDi||PWi)⊕Ai
B′i = h(PWi||p′i)
C ′i = B
′
i ⊕Di ⊕ IDi
h(qi||x) = C ′i ⊕Ai
E′i = Ai ⊕B′i ⊕ h(qi||x)
E′i
?
= Ei
Generates Ni
AIDi = IDi ⊕ IDSj
Gi = Ni ⊕ C ′i ⊕Ai
Hi = Gi ⊕ h(SIDj ||Ni||T1)
Ii = Ni ⊕ p′i ⊕ IDi
Ji = h(Gi||Hi||Ii||p′i||T1)
{AIDi, Gi, Ii, Ji, T1}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Open Channel
∆T1 ≤ T2 − T1
IDi = αj ⊕AIDi ⊕ βj
N ′i = Fi ⊕Gi ⊕ IDi
H ′i = Gi ⊕ h(SIDj ||N ′i ||T1)
p′i = N
′
i ⊕ IDi ⊕ Ii
J ′i = h(Gi||H ′i||Ii||p′i||T1)
J ′i
?
= Ji
Generates Nj
Kj = N
′
i ⊕Nj ⊕ p′i
Mj = h(Kj ||N ′i ||Nj ||J ′i ||T2)
{Kj ,Mj , T2}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Open Channel
∆T2 ≤ T3 − T2
Calculates...
N ′j = Ni ⊕Kj ⊕ p′i
M ′j = h(Kj ||Ni||N ′j ||Ji||T2)
M ′j
?
= Mj
SKUi = SKSj = h(IDi||SIDj ||Ni||Nj ||p′i||Hi||∆T1)
Figure 4: The proposed login and authentication
Ii, Ji in the proposed model. First of all, T1 is used inHi and Ji. Therefore,A needs to
compute these variables (Ji and Hi) to forge a login request. As a result, s/he requires
some amount of time to forge a request or generate a fake login request in future.
Accordingly, s/he should use fresh time-stamp (say T ′1). In order to work out for forged
parameters (J ′i and H
′
i), A needs Gi, Ni, p′i. Here, Gi is calculated as Ni ⊕ Ai ⊕ C ′i
and hence, A should know Ai and C ′i additionally. In the proposed method, Ni and
p′i are randomly generated numbers. Moreover, A is not able to enumerate C ′i and Ai
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due to unavailability of essential credentials (Bi, p′i, PWi, and Di). For these reasons,
an adversary cannot obtain required credentials anyhow and thus, s/he is restricted to
forge Hi and Ii. Additionally, Sj confirms the validity of a login request. As a result,
A fails to make feasible a user impersonation attack in the proposed method.
5.1.3 Replay
In the proposed scheme, we have used the concept of a time-stamp to identify transac-
tion time. Here, SCRk sends {IDi, Ji, Gi, Ii, T1} to Sj over an open medium and Sj
transfers {Mj , Kj , T2} to SCRk via an insecure channel. Thus, A can attempt to stop
or delay this request/response. However, Sj confirms validity of {IDi, Gi, Ii, Ji, T1}
by executing ∆T1 ≤ T2 − T1. Similarly, SCRk proceeds further after verifying (by
calculating ∆T2) the reasonableness of {Mj , Kj , T2}. If SCRk does not get a re-
sponse message from Sj within a reasonable time, then Ui understands thatA has tried
to interrupt {IDi, Ji, Ii, Gi, T1} and after that, SCRk terminates the session directly.
It means that if A tries to perform a replay attack, it will be identified at the receiver
side. Additionally, A cannot change T1 in the request or T2 in the response message
because these time-stamps are used in Hi, Ji, Mj and these parameters are confirmed
at the receiver end. Furthermore,A does not have essential credentials to calculate Hi,
Ji, Mj . After these considerations, an adversary is not able to perform a replay attack
in the advised protocol.
5.1.4 Smart Card Lost
This attack is applicable if A can deal with Sj mutually and successfully after sending
a bogus login request. We assume that a legitimate user (Ui) can lose his/her SCi or
someone can steal SCi. Therefore, A has knowledge of SCi variables (Ai, Di, Ei)
and common channel parameters (IDi, T2, Gi, T1, Ii, Ji, Kj , Mj) according to the
suggested protocol for this attack. Here, A should compute a login request in such a
way on which Sj should be agreed to process further. Ui sends {IDi, Ji, Ii, Gi, T1}
to Sj as a login message. These values are calculated as Ji = h(Gi||Hi||Ii||p′i||T1),
Ii = Ni ⊕ p′i ⊕ IDi, Hi = Gi ⊕ h(SIDj ||Ni||T1). Now, A needs Gi, Ni, p′i for
enumerating H ′i and J
′
i . But A does not find any proficiency to obtain/calculate these
credentials without knowingBi, p′i, PWi,Ni, andDi (see Section 5.1.2). Additionally,
Sj checks freshness of a received login request. If (T2 − T1) is beyond ∆T1, then Sj
discards that request immediately. Hence, A cannot proceed to generate a valid login
request and this stops to an adversary for further process. In this fashion, the proposed
model is protected against a smart card lost attack.
5.1.5 Session key disclosure
If A can generate/compute a valid session key, then there is a possibility of a session
key disclosure attack. A session key is calculated as SKUi/SKSj = h(IDi||SIDj ||Ni||Nj ||p′i||Hi||∆T1)
in the suggested scheme. Thus, A should know p′i,∆T1, Ni, Hi, and Nj in order to
compute it illegally. We consider that IDi and SIDj are identity values of Ui and
Sj and thus, these variables are known to A generally. Next, ∆T1 is the difference
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between T2 and T1. Hence, it is also available to an attacker. However, A does not
have Ni, Nj , p′i, and Hi. In the proposed method, p
′
i, Ni, and Nj are random numbers
and these are only known to Ui and Sj for a limited time and for this session only.
Further, both (Ui and Sj) are agreed on Nj and Ni for a fixed period. Accordingly, it
is hard to know/get these random values. In the proposed method, Hi is computed as
h(SIDj ||Ni||T1)⊕Gi and therefore, A cannot calculate Hi correctly without having
Ni. For these reasons, A is unable to proceed for a session key (SKSj / SKUi ) any-
way. After this analysis, a session key disclosure attack is not feasible in the proposed
system.
5.1.6 Man-in-the-middle
If a person can understand transmitted request/response messages in public environ-
ment, then this attack is considerable. In the proposed mechanism, SCRk transmits
{IDi, Ji, Gi, Ii, T1} to Sj and Sj responses to SCRk as {Mj , Kj , T2} through an
open channel. Therefore, A can know IDi, T1, and T2 based on these transactions.
IDi is a user’s identity and it can be identifiable generally. T2 and T1 are time-stamps
and these time-stamps are not profitable toA effectively because T1 and T2 are valid for
a limited period only. Accordingly, both (Sj and Ui) do not consider T1/T2 for further
process or do not accept any request/response beyond ∆T1/∆T2. Next, A needs other
vital credentials (e.g., PWi, p′i,Ni, h(qi||x)) to understandGi, Ji, and Ii. Similarly,A
requires Nj , Ni, h(qi||x), G′i for Mj and Kj . ButA cannot obtain these private values
based on public channel parameters. Consequently, an attacker fails to work out for a
man-in-the-middle attack in the suggested method.
5.1.7 Insider
If an authorized user can compute a valid login request using his/her own credentials
for another legal user, then an insider attack can be applied in the system. We consider
two legitimate users (UA and Ui) in the proposed scheme and UA acts an adversary
to impersonate Ui. UA has his/her SCA and s/he knows SCA values (AA, DA, EA).
In general, Ui sends a login request to Sj via a public channel. Therefore, UA has
knowledge of IDi, Ji, Gi, Ii, T1. To get access of system resources behalf of Ui, UA
needs to compute a fake login request freshly and this request should be accepted by
Sj to generate a session key mutually. For this, UA should enumerate Ii, Ji, and
Gi correctly so that Sj will be agreed on these values legitimately. UA should know
Ni, IDi, p
′
i (for Ii), Gi, Hi, Ii, p
′
i (for Ji), and Ai, Ni, Ci (for Gi). We have already
described that A cannot get Ni, Ai, Ci, p′i, Hi (see Section 5.1.2). Similarly, UA is not
able to get relevant credentials. Additionally, a time-stamp is used in the suggested
method. Next, qi is a random nonce and it is not known to anyone in the proposed
system. Further, qi is concatenated with x and then, Sj has performed a one-way
hash operation. Accordingly, it is difficult to know qi of Ui. In this fashion, UA fails
to calculate a bogus login request. Thus, the suggested scheme can withstand to an
insider attack.
Table 2 shows a comparison in terms of different security attributes. A smart card
lost attack is feasible in [12], [13], [14], [15]. Authentication schemes ([11], [12], [13])
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Table 2: Security features of various authentications protocols
Security Attributes
Schemes A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9
Lee et al. [11] X X X X X X X Yes No
Banerjee et al. [12] X X X X X X X Yes No
Sun et al. [13] X X X X X X X Yes No
Li et al. [14] X X X X X X X Yes No
Jangirala et al. [15] X X X X X X X Yes No
Irshad et al. [16] F X F X X X X No Yes
Ying and Nayak [17] X X X X X X X Yes No
Proposed X X X X X X X Yes No
A1: Smart card lost; A2: Impersonation; A3: Password guessing;
A4: Replay; A5: Session key disclosure; A6: Man-in-the-middle;
A7: Insider; A8: Two-factor authentication; A9: Three-factor authentication;
X: Secure; X: Vulnerable;F: Insecure without biometric-identity;
are vulnerable to an impersonation attack. An adversary has an opportunity to confirm
a guessed password in [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] easily. The schemes ([13], [14],
[15], [16]) cannot withstand against a replay attack. A session key disclosure attack
can be performed in [12], [14], and [16]. Banerjee et al.’s scheme [12] is also weak
against a man-in-the-middle attack. A legitimate person acts as an adversary to perform
an insider attack in [12] and [13]. A biometric identity is used in [16] to enhance
security but it fails to resist attacks (replay and session key disclosure). Additionally,
if we consider that a biometric identity can be forged, then two other attacks (smart
card lost and a password guessing) are partially possible in [16]. In this way, various
authentication schemes ([11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]) are insecure against various
attacks. However, the proposed scheme can withstand against different security attacks
as mentioned in Table 2. Further, the suggested protocol can achieve this security level
using two-factor authentication only. Therefore, the proposed method is more secure
compared to other schemes.
5.2 Performance Analysis
We explain different performance measure, i.e., execution time, storage cost, and com-
munication overhead. Then, we present outcomes of various remote user authentication
mechanisms based on these performance parameters.
5.2.1 Execution Time
It is depended on the total number of needed cryptographic operations to carry out the
authentication procedure. In this computational cost, most of the verification schemes
have used four different cryptographic functions, e.g., one-way hash (Th(·)), elliptic
curve cryptography (TEC), concatenation (T||), chebyshev chaotic (TCC), and Ex-OR
(T⊕). Generally, these operations expect some amount of time in the execution. We
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Table 3: Execution Cost Comparison for different verification schemes
Schemes Registration Login and Authentication
Lee et al. [11] 3Th(·) (≈1.74 ms) 11Th(·) + 6TCC (≈132.62
ms)
Banerjee et al. [12] 7Th(·) (≈4.06 ms) 17Th(·) (≈9.86 ms)
Sun et al. [13] 6Th(·) (≈3.48 ms) 18Th(·) (≈10.44 ms)
Li et al. [14] 3Th(·) (≈1.74 ms) 19Th(·) + 6TCC (≈137.26
ms)
Jangirala et al. [15] 7Th(·) (≈4.06 ms) 23Th(·) (≈13.34 ms)
Irshad et al. [16] 3Th(·) (≈1.74 ms) 29Th(·) + 6TCC (≈143.06
ms)
Ying and Nayak [17] 4Th(·) + 2TEC (≈77.76 ms) 9Th(·)+7TEC (≈269.26 ms)
Proposed 3Th(·)(≈1.74 ms) 10Th(·) (≈5.80 ms)
consider the running time based on a specific system configuration, i.e., the Ubuntu
12.04.1 32-bit OS, 2 GB RAM with Intel 2.4 GHz CPU [16]. The pairing-based cryp-
tography library is inherited for cryptographic operations. After noting down a running
time of these functions, we do not include a computing time for T|| and T⊕ because
they need highly negligible time to accomplish an operation compared to other func-
tions (TEC , TCC , and Th(·)). Therefore, we consider only Th(·), TEC , and TCC for
the implementation time and these functions expect 0.58 milliseconds (ms), 37.72 ms
and 21.04 ms respectively. The comparability between varied authentication schemes
([11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], and the suggested method) is appeared in Table 3. In
general, the registration phase is executed once only but the login and authentication
process is performed when a legitimate user wants access system resources. Therefore,
we mainly focus on the execution time of the login and authentication phase. After
looking requirement of different cryptographic functions in Table 3, Banerjee et al.’s
scheme [12] takes less execution time (i.e., 9.86 ms) compared to other authentication
methods ([11], [13], [14], [15], [16], and [17]). Next, the scheme [13] requires 10.44
ms to complete the login and authentication phase. Although these protocols ([12] and
[13]) are vulnerable to various attacks (see Table 2). However, the suggested method
can be implemented in 5.80 ms and it is safe against different security attacks (see
Section 5.1). Thus, the proposed protocol can be executed rapidly rather than other
mentioned authentication systems.
5.2.2 Storage Cost
During the registration or the initialization phase, the registration authority stores some
credentials into SCi and for this, the system needs to reserve a specified number of
bytes. An identity/random nonce variable needs 8 bytes, a chebyshev chaotic function
requires 16 bytes, elliptic curve (EC) needs 64 bytes, and 32 bytes (SHA-2) are expected
as a storage cost. Lee et al.’s scheme [11] requires 2 (one-way hash), 1 (time-stamp),
and 3 (identity/normal) variables. Banerjee et al.’s model [12] and Sun et al.’s system
[13] need 5 (one-way hash) and 1 (identity) variables individually. Li et al.’s mecha-
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nism [14] expects 1 (time-stamp), 3 (one-way hash), and 2 (identity/normal)variables.
5 (one-way hash) and 2 (normal) parameters are needed in [15]. Irshad et al.’s pro-
tocol [16] requires 3 (one-way hash), 3 (identity/normal), and 1 (chebyshev chaotic)
variables. The protocol [17] requires 3 (EC), 2 (one-way hash), and 1 (random nonce).
However, the suggested system needs to save only four (computed using a one-way
hash) and one (normal) parameters. Fig. 5 shows required storage memory (in bytes)
for various authentication models individually. In general, the system saves different
credentials into the smart card once. Consequently, this is a one-time process only.
Lee et al.’s scheme [11] needs 92 bytes in storage, which is ∼19 % less compared to
the suggested method but the scheme [11] is weak to two security attacks (password
guessing and impersonation) and it expects very high implementation time (see Table
3).
5.2.3 Communication overhead
In the login and authentication procedure, both (sender and receiver) transmits differ-
ent parameters in order to generate a common session key and therefore, they require
to spend essential bytes as a communication overhead. An identity variable needs 8
bytes, EC requires 64 bytes, a chebyshev chaotic function expects 16 bytes, a time-
stamp requires 4 bytes, and 32 bytes (SHA-2) are needed for a one-way hash during
the communication. Lee et al.’s method [11] can be performed using 3 (chebyshev
chaotic) and 5 (one-way hash) parameters. The schemes ([12] and [13]) require 7 (one-
way hash) variables separately. Li et al’s system [14] needs 1 (identity), 13 (one-way
hash), and 4 (chebyshev chaotic) parameters. The scheme [15] can be carried out with
7 (one-way hash) variables. Irshad et al.’s system [16] expects 16 (one-way hash), 1
(identity), and 4 (chebyshev chaotic) parameters. Ying and Nayak’s scheme [17] needs
5 (EC), 1 (identity), and 2 (one-way hash).
However, the proposed protocol can be implemented using only three (identity),
three (one-way hash), and two (time-stamp) variables. The communication cost com-
parison is shown in Fig. 5. Lee et al.’s scheme [11] requires 208 bytes for communica-
tion but the communication overhead is∼38 % less in the suggested protocol compared
to [11]. Thus, the proposed method needs less energy to provide services.
5.2.4 Energy Consumption
During the authentication phase, the system takes a fixed amount of energy to execute
various operations and to send different parameters. This is known as the energy con-
sumption and it is measured in millijoule (mJ). The energy consumption is calculated
as ECEXE = (V ∗ I ∗ t) for the execution cost and ECCC = (V ∗ I ∗m)/(Dr) for
communication cost. Where, V = voltage power, I = current, t = the execution time,
m = message size, and Dr = data rate (6100 Kbps). If the authentication protocol
takes low execution time and less communication overhead, then it consumes less en-
ergy compared to other authentication schemes. The proposed protocol needs 5.80 ms
as the execution time and 128 bytes in the communication, which are less compared to
other authentication mechanisms ([11], [12], [13], [15], [16], and [17]). Therefore, the
proposed scheme is also energy-efficient compared to other protocols.
14
Figure 5: Communication and storage cost demand for distinct authentication systems.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a secure and energy-efficient remote user authentication protocol for
the multi-server based system. Security analysis of the proposed system is done, and it
is shown that our model resists various attacks, i.e., password guessing, impersonation,
insider, man-in-the-middle, replay, smart card lost, and session key disclosure even
without biometric identity. After analyzing the performance, the results show that the
suggested scheme is implemented at least∼44 % more efficiently compared to relevant
schemes. Further, the proposed system comparatively requires ∼42 % less communi-
cation overhead and ∼19 % less storage space. Accordingly, the proposed method
consumes less energy in the authentication process. To make the multi-server authen-
tication mechanism more attack-proof, we are working to enhance the security and
efficiency of the multi-server authentication system, by analyzing meet-in-the-middle
and side-channel attacks, etc.
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